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Abstract— This paper focuses on the issue of energy efficiency
in wireless data networks through a game theoretic approach.
The case considered is that in which each user is allowed to
vary its transmit power, spreading code, and uplink receiver in
order to maximize its own utility, which is here defined as the
ratio of data throughput to transmit power. In particular, the
case in which linear multiuser detectors are employed at the
receiver is treated first, and, then, the more challenging case
in which non-linear decision feedback multiuser receivers are
adopted is addressed. It is shown that, for both receivers, the
problem at hand of utility maximization can be regarded as
a non-cooperative game, and it is proved that a unique Nash
equilibrium point exists. Simulation results show that significant
performance gains can be obtained through both non-linear
processing and spreading code optimization; in particular, for
systems with a number of users not larger than the processing
gain, remarkable gains come from spreading code optimization,
while, for overloaded systems, the largest gains come from
the use of non-linear processing. In every case, however, the
non-cooperative games proposed here are shown to outperform
competing alternatives.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory [1] is a branch of mathematics that has been
applied primarily in economics and other social sciences to
study the interactions among several autonomous subjects with
contrasting interests. More recently, it has been discovered that
it can also be used for the design and analysis of communi-
cation systems, mostly with application to resource allocation
algorithms [2], and, in particular, to power control [3]. As
examples, the reader is referred to [4], [5], [6]. Here, for
a multiple access wireless data network, noncooperative and
cooperative games are introduced, wherein each user chooses
its transmit power in order to maximize its own utility, defined
as the ratio of the throughput to transmit power. While the
above papers consider the issue of power control assuming that
a conventional matched filter is available at the receiver, the
recent paper [7] considers the problem of joint linear receiver
design and power control so as to maximize the utility of each
user. It is shown here that the inclusion of receiver design
in the considered game brings remarkable advantages, and,
also, results based on the powerful large-system analysis are
presented.
This paper is the first in this area that considers the cross-
layer issue of utility maximization with respect to the choice
of receiver, spreading code and transmit power. First of all,
we generalize the game considered in [7] by considering
also spreading code optimization. We show that iterative
algorithms, of the same kind proposed in [8], can be applied to
our scenario in order to improve the achieved Signal-to-Noise
plus Interference (SINR) of each user. We will show that the
newly considered noncooperative game admits a unique Nash
equilibrium and achieves remarkable gains with respect to the
performance levels attained by the solution proposed in [7].
Then, we consider the problem of utility maximization with
respect to transmit power and spreading code, for the case
in which a non-linear decision feedback receiver is used. We
thus propose two noncooperative games wherein first transmit
power is chosen so as to maximize utility, and, then, joint
spreading code optimization and power control is undertaken
for utility maximization. Our results will show that remarkable
gains are granted by the use of spreading code optimization
when the number of users does not exceed the processing
gain (undersaturated region), while, for saturated systems, non-
linear interference cancellation, eventually coupled with code
optimization, provides the most significant gains.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section contains some preliminaries and the system model of
interest. Section III introduces a non-cooperative game for the
case in which linear receivers are employed, while in Section
IV we introduce two non-cooperative utility maximization
games for the case that a non-linear interference cancellation
receiver is adopted. In Section V we present and discuss the
results of some computer simulations that show the merits
of the proposed games and their advantages with respect
to competing alternatives. Finally, we give some concluding
remarks in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider the uplink of a K-user synchronous, single-cell,
direct-sequence code division multiple access (DS/CDMA)
network with processing gain N and subject to flat fading.
After chip-matched filtering and sampling at the chip-rate, the
N -dimensional received data vector, say r, corresponding to
one symbol interval, can be written as
r =
K∑
k=1
√
pkhkbksk + n , (1)
wherein pk is the transmit power of the k-th user1, bk ∈
{−1, 1} is the information symbol of the k-th user, and hk is
the real2 channel gain between the k-th user’s transmitter and
the access point (AP); the actual value of hk depends on both
the distance of the k-th user’s terminal from the AP and the
channel fading fluctuations. The N -dimensional vector sk is
the spreading code of the k-th user; we assume that the entries
of sk are real and that sTk sk = ‖sk‖2 = 1, with (·)T denoting
transpose. Finally, n is the ambient noise vector, which we
assume to be a zero-mean white Gaussian random process with
covariance matrix (N0/2)IN , with IN the identity matrix of
order N . An alternative and compact representation of (1) is
given by
r = SP 1/2Hb+ n , (2)
wherein S = [s1, . . . , sK ] is the N×K-dimensional spreading
code matrix, P and H are K × K-dimensional diagonal
matrices, whose diagonals are [p1, . . . , pK ] and [h1, . . . , hK ],
respectively, and, finally, b = [b1, . . . , bK ]T is the K-
dimensional vector of the data symbols.
Assume now that each mobile terminal sends its data in
packets of M bits, and that it is interested both in having its
data received with as small as possible error probability at
the AP, and in making careful use of the energy stored in its
battery. Obviously, these are conflicting goals, since error-free
reception may be achieved by increasing the received SNR, i.e.
by increasing the transmit power, which of course comes at the
expense of battery life3. A useful approach to quantify these
conflicting goals is to define the utility of the k-th user as the
ratio of its throughput, defined as the number of information
bits that are received with no error in unit time, to its transmit
power [4], [5], i.e.
uk =
Tk
pk
. (3)
Note that uk is measured in bit/Joule, i.e. it represents the
number of successful bit transmissions that can be made
for each Joule of energy drained from the battery. Denoting
by R the common rate of the network (extension to the
case in which each user transmits with its own rate Rk is
quite simple) and assuming that each packet of M symbols
1To simplify subsequent notation, we assume that the transmitted power
pk subsumes also the gain of the transmit and receive antennas.
2We assume here, for simplicity, a real channel model; generalization to
practical channels, with I and Q components, is straightforward.
3Of course there are many other strategies to lower the data error prob-
ability, such as for example the use of error correcting codes, diversity
exploitation, and implementation of optimal reception techniques at the
receiver. Here, however, we are mainly interested to energy efficient data
transmission and power usage, so we consider only the effects of varying the
transmit power, the receiver and the spreading code on energy efficiency.
contains L information symbols and M−L overhead symbols,
reserved, e.g., for channel estimation and/or parity checks, the
throughput Tk can be expressed as
Tk = R
L
M
Pk (4)
wherein Pk denotes the the probability that a packet from the
k-th user is received error-free. In the considered DS/CDMA
setting, the term Pk depends formally on a number of pa-
rameters such as the spreading codes of all the users and the
diagonal entries of the matrices P and H , as well as on the
strength of the used error correcting codes. However, a custom-
ary approach is to model the multiple access interference as a
Gaussian random process, and assume that Pk is an increasing
function of the k-th user’s Signal-to-Interference plus Noise-
Ratio (SINR) γk, which is naturally the case in many practical
situations.
Recall that, for the case in which a linear receiver is used
to detect the data symbol bk, according, i.e., to the decision
rule
b̂k = sign
[
d
T
k r
]
, (5)
with b̂k the estimate of bk and dk the N -dimensional vector
representing the receive filter for the user k, it is easily seen
that the SINR γk can be written as
γk =
pkhk2(d
T
k sk)2
N0
2
‖dk‖2 +
∑
i6=k
pihi2(d
T
k si)2
. (6)
Of related interest is also the mean square error (MSE) for the
user k, which, for a linear receiver, is defined as
MSEk = E
{(
bk − dTk r
)
2
}
= 1+dTkMdk−2
√
pkhkd
T
k sk ,
(7)
wherein E {·} denotes statistical expectation and M =(
SHPH
T
S
T + N0
2
IN
)
is the covariance matrix of the data.
The exact shape of Pk(γk) depends on factors such as the
modulation and coding type. However, in all cases of relevant
interest, it is an increasing function of γk with a sigmoidal
shape, and converges to unity as γk → +∞; as an example,
for binary phase-shift-keying (BPSK) modulation coupled with
no channel coding, it is easily shown that
Pk(γk) =
[
1−Q(
√
2γk)
]M
, (8)
with Q(·) the complementary cumulative distribution function
of a zero-mean random Gaussian variate with unit variance.
A plot of (8) is shown in Fig. 1 for the case M = 100.
It should be noted that substituting (8) into (4), and, in
turn, into (3), leads to a strong incongruence. Indeed, for
pk → 0, we have γk → 0, but Pk converges to a small but
non-zero value (i.e. 2−M ), thus implying that an unboundedly
large utility can be achieved by transmitting with zero power,
i.e. not transmitting at all and making blind guesses at the
receiver on what data were transmitted. To circumvent this
problem, a customary approach [5], [7] is to replace Pk with
an efficiency function, say fk(γk), whose behavior should
approximate as close as possible that of Pk, except that for
γk → 0 it is required that fk(γk) = o(γk). The function
f(γk) = (1 − e−γk)M is a widely accepted substitute for
the true probability of correct packet reception, and in the
following we will adopt this model4. This efficiency function is
increasing and S-shaped, converges to unity as γk approaches
infinity, and has a continuous first order derivative. Note that
we have omitted the subscript “k′′, i.e. we have used the
notation f(γk) in place of fk(γk) since we assume that the
efficiency function is the same for all the users.
Summing up, substituting (4) into (3) and replacing the
probability Pk with the above defined efficiency function, we
obtain the following expression for the k-th user’s utility:
uk = R
L
M
f(γk)
pk
, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K . (9)
Now, based on the utility definition (9), many interesting
questions arise concerning how each user may maximize its
utility, and how this maximization affects utilities achieved by
other users. Likewise, it is natural to question what happens
in a non-cooperative setting wherein each user autonomously
and selfishly tries to maximize its own utility, with no care
for other users utilities. In particular, in this latter situation,
is the system able to reach an equilibrium wherein no user is
interested in varying its parameters since each action it would
take would lead to a decrease in its own utility? Game theory
provides means to study these interactions and to provide some
useful and insightful answers to these questions.
Initially, game theory was applied in this context mainly as a
tool to study non-cooperative scenarios wherein mobile users
are allowed to vary their transmit power only (see [4], [5],
[6], for example) to maximize utility, and where conventional
matched filtering is used at the receiver. Recently, instead, in
[7] such an approach has been extended to the cross layer
scenario in which each user may vary its power and its uplink
linear receiver, i.e. the problem of joint linear multiuser detec-
tion optimization and power control for utility maximization
has been tackled. In the following, we will go further by
considering the case of spreading code choice, power control
and linear receiver design for utility maximization. Moreover,
the case in which a parametric non-linear decision feedback
receiver is used will be considered, and new games wherein
optimization of this receiver, spreading code choice and power
control is performed jointly in order to maximize utility will
be proposed.
III. NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH LINEAR RECEIVERS
We begin by considering a noncooperative game wherein
each user aims to maximizing its own utility by varying
its spreading code, its transmit power, and its linear uplink
receiver. Formally, the proposed game G can be described as
the triplet G = [K, {Sk} , {uk}], wherein K = {1, 2, . . . ,K}
4See Fig. 1 for a comparison between the Probability Pk and the efficiency
function.
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efficiency function versus receive SINR and for packet size M = 100. Note
the S-shape of both functions.
is the set of active users participating in the game, uk is the
k-th user’s utility defined in (9), and
Sk = [0, Pk,max]×RN ×RN1 , (10)
is the set of possible actions (strategies) that user k can take.
It is seen that Sk is written as the Cartesian product of three
different sets, and indeed [0, Pk,max] is the range of available
transmit powers for the k-th user (note that Pk,max is the
maximum allowed transmit power for user k), RN , with R the
real line, defines the set of all possible linear receive filters,
and, finally,
RN1 =
{
d ∈ RN : dTd = 1
}
,
defines the set of the allowed spreading codes5 for user k.
Before proceeding further, it is also convenient to define the
concept of Nash equilibrium. Let
(s1, s2, . . . , sK) ∈ S1 × S2 × . . .SK
denote a certain strategy K-tuple for the active users. The
point (s1, s2, . . . , sK) is a Nash equilibrium if for any user k,
we have
uk(s1, . . . , sk, . . . , sK) ≥ uk(s1, . . . , s∗k, . . . , sK) ,
∀s∗k 6= sk . Otherwise stated, at a Nash equilibrium, no user
can unilaterally improve its own utility by taking a different
strategy. A fast reading of this definition might lead to think
that at Nash equilibrium users’ utilities achieve their maximum
values. Actually, this is not the case, since the existence
of a Nash equilibrium point does not imply that no other
strategy K-tuple does exist that can lead to an improvement
of the utilities of some users while not decreasing the utilities
of the remaining ones. These latter strategies are usually
5Here we assume that the spreading codes have real entries; the problem
of utility maximization with reasonable complexity for the case of discrete-
valued entries is a challenging issue that will be considered in the future.
said to be Pareto-optimal [1]. Otherwise stated, at a Nash
equilibrium, each user, provided that the other users’ strategies
do not change, is not interested in changing its own strategy.
However, if some sort of cooperation would be available, users
might agree to simultaneously switch to a different strategy
K-tuple, so as to improve the utility of some, if not all,
active users. In this paper, we will focus on Nash equilibrium
points only, since they are the result of non-cooperative games.
Moreover, it can be shown, although this is not discussed here
due to lack of space, that, for the considered problem, the
utilities achieved by Nash-equilibrium points are only slightly
smaller than those achieved on the Pareto-optimal frontier of
the game.
Summing up, the proposed noncooperative game can be cast
as the following maximization problem
max
Sk
uk = max
pk,dk,sk
uk(pk,dk, sk) , ∀k = 1, . . . ,K . (11)
Given (9), the above maximization can be also written as
max
pk,dk,sk
f(γk(pk,dk, sk))
pk
, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K . (12)
Moreover, since the efficiency function is monotone and non-
decreasing, we also have
max
pk,dk,sk
f(γk(pk,dk, sk))
pk
= max
pk
f
(
max
dk,sk
γk(pk,dk, sk)
)
pk
,
(13)
i.e. we can first take care of SINR maximization with respect
to spreading codes and linear receivers, and then focus on
maximization of the resulting utility with respect to transmit
power.
With regard to this latter point, recall that, if a linear Min-
imum MSE (MMSE) receiver is used, the following relation
can be shown to hold [9]
TMSE =
K∑
i=1
MSEi =
K∑
i=1
1
1 + γi
, (14)
wherein TMSE is the total MSE. Otherwise stated, among
linear receivers, the MMSE receiver is the one that maxi-
mizes the SINR vector (γ1, . . . , γK). Now assume that we
wish to minimize the MSE for each user by varying not
only the receiver, but also the spreading code. This problem
has been considered in [8], [10], [11]; in particular, if we
let D = [d1, . . . ,dK ] and denote by (·)+ Moore-Penrose
pseudoinversion, it has been therein shown that the sum of
the MSE’s of all the users admits a unique global optimum,
and that the iterations
di =
√
pihi
(
SHPH
T
S
T + N0
2
IN
)−1
si ∀i = 1, . . . ,K
si =
√
pihi
(
pihi2DD
T + µiIN
)+
di ∀i = 1, . . . ,K
(15)
admit a unique stable fixed point that is the global minimizer
of the total MSE. In the above relations, µi should be set so
that ‖si‖ = 1. No details are given in [8] on how this could
be done in an efficient way, so in the Appendix we outline a
procedure for efficiently finding the value of µi ensuring the
constraint ‖si‖ = 1.
Now, it is natural to ask if minimization of the total MSE
with respect to both linear receivers and spreading codes still
maximizes the user’s SINR’s. We can thus state the following
result.
Lemma 1: Let S¯ and D¯ be the spreading code matrix and the
linear receiver matrix that jointly achieve the global minimum
of the total MSE. Then, no strategy of spreading codes and
decoder can be found to increase the SINR of one or more
users without decreasing the SINR of at least one other user.
Proof: If S¯ and D¯ are the global minimizers of the MSE,
then D¯ contains the MMSE receivers resulting from the
spreading codes of S¯. Denote by
{
γi(S¯, D¯)
}K
i=1
the SINR
values achieved by the matrices S¯ and D¯. Assume now
that there exists a spreading code matrix S∗ 6= S¯ such that
γi(S
∗, D¯) > γi(S¯, D¯), for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and
γj(S
∗, D¯) ≥ γj(S¯, D¯) for j 6= i. If this is the case, we
can make an MMSE update and obtain the matrix D∗ of
the MMSE receivers corresponding to the codes in S∗. For
a given set of spreading codes, using the MMSE receiver
always yields a maximization of the SINR and a minimization
of the MSE. We thus have γi(S∗,D∗) > γi(S¯, D¯), and
γj(S
∗,D∗) ≥ γj(S¯, D¯), ∀j 6= i. Consequently, given relation
(14), we have
TMSE(S∗,D∗) < TMSE(S¯, D¯) ,
which contradicts the starting assumptions that S¯ and D¯ are
the global minimizers of the MSE.
We are now ready to express our result on the non-
cooperative game for spreading code optimization, linear re-
ceiver design and power control.
Proposition 1: The non-cooperative game defined in (11)
admits a unique Nash equilibrium point (p∗k,d
∗
k, s
∗
k), for k =
1, . . . ,K , wherein
- s
∗
k and d
∗
k are the unique k-th user spreading code and
receive filter6 resulting from iterations (15). Denote by
γ∗k the corresponding SINR.
- p∗k = min{p¯k, Pk,max}, with p¯k the k-th user transmit
power such that the k-th user maximum SINR γ∗k equals
γ¯, i.e. the unique solution of the equation f(γ) = γf ′(γ),
with f ′(γ) the derivative of f(γ).
Proof: The proof is a generalization of the one provided in [7]
and so is only briefly sketched here. Since ∂γk/∂pk = γk/pk,
it is easily seen that each user’s utility is maximized if each
user is able to achieve the SINR γ¯, that is the unique7
solution of the equation f(γ) = γf ′(γ). By Lemma 1, running
iterations (15) until convergence is reached provides the set
of spreading codes and MMSE receivers that maximize the
SINRs for all the users. As a consequence, the utility of
6Actually the linear receive filter is unique up to a positive scaling factor.
7Uniqueness of γ¯ is ensured by the fact that the efficiency function is
S-shaped [12].
each user is maximized by adjusting transmit powers so that
the optimized (with respect to spreading codes and linear
receivers) SINRs equal γ¯.
So far, we have shown how to set the transmit power,
spreading code and receiver design to maximize utility at
the Nash equilibrium. It remains to be shown that a Nash
equilibrium exists. Luckily, we can use the same arguments of
[5] and state that a unique Nash equilibrium point exists since
each user’s utility function is quasi-concave8 in the transmit
power pk and since the efficiency function is S-shaped.
IV. NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH NONLINEAR
DECISION-FEEDBACK RECEIVERS
Consider now the case in which a non-linear decision
feedback receiver is used at the receiver. We assume that the
users are indexed according to a non-increasing sorting of
their channel gains, i.e. we assume that h1 > h2 > . . . , hK .
We consider a serial interference cancellation (SIC) receiver
wherein detection of the symbol from the k-th user is made
according to the following rule
b̂k = sign
dTk
r −∑
j<k
√
pjhj b̂jsj
 . (16)
Otherwise stated, when detecting a certain symbol, the contri-
bution from the data symbols that have been already detected is
subtracted from the received data. If past decisions are correct,
users that are detected later enjoy a considerable reduction of
multiple access interference, and indeed the SINR for user
k, under the assumption of correcteness of past decisions, is
written as
γk =
pkhk2(d
T
k sk)2
N0
2
‖dk‖2 +
∑
j>k
pjhj2(d
T
k sj)2
. (17)
A considerable amount of literature exists on decision feed-
back receivers, and many detectors of this kind have been
proposed and analyzed. Here, our goal is just to show that non-
linear receivers coupled with spreading code optimization and
power control can bring remarkable performance advantages
with respect to linear receivers. As a consequence, we consider
only the decision rule (16) and introduce noncooperative
games built on that, with no further optimization. As an
example, receiver (16) might be optimized with respect to
the users’ detection order, or by using properly distorted
versions of the signal to be subtracted; these issues will not
be considered here due to lack of space.
Now, given receiver (16) and the SINR expression (17),
we consider the problems of utility maximization with respect
to the transmit power, spreading code choice, and receivers
d1, . . . ,dK . To begin with, let us neglect spreading code
optimization and consider the problem
max
pk,dk
f(γk(pk,dk))
pk
, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K . (18)
8A function is quasi-concave if there exists a point below which the function
is nondecreasing, and above which the function is nonincreasing.
The following result can be shown to hold.
Proposition 2: Define Sk = [sk, . . . , sK ], P k =
diag(pk, . . . , pK) and Hk = diag(hk, . . . , hK). The non-
cooperative game defined in (18) admits a unique Nash
equilibrium point (p∗k,d
∗
k), for k = 1, . . . ,K , wherein
- d
∗
k =
√
pkhk(SkHkP kH
T
kS
T
k +
N0
2
IN )
−1
sk is the
unique k-th user receive filter9 that maximize the user
k SINR γk given in (17). Denote γ∗k = maxdk γk.
- p∗k = min{p¯k, Pk,max}, with p¯k the k-th user transmit
power such that the k-th user maximum SINR γ∗k equals
γ¯, i.e. the unique solution of the equation f(γ) = γf ′(γ),
with f ′(γ) the derivative of f(γ).
Proof: The proof is omitted here due to lack of space. It can
be constructed along the same lines as that of Proposition 1.
Consider, finally, the maximization
max
pk,dk,sk
f(γk(pk,dk, sk))
pk
, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K . (19)
The existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for this
game is guaranteed by the following result.
Proposition 3: Define Dk = [d1, . . . ,dk]. The non-
cooperative game defined in (19) admits a unique Nash
equilibrium point (p∗k, s∗k,d
∗
k), for k = 1, . . . ,K , wherein
- d
∗
k and s∗k are the unique stable fixed points of the iter-
ations dk =
√
pkhk
(
SkHkP kH
T
k S
T
k +
N0
2
IN
)−1
sk
and sk =
√
pkhk
(
pkhk2DkD
T
k + µkIN
)+
dk, ∀k =
1, . . . ,K and with µk such that ‖sk‖ = 1. Denote by γ∗k
the k-th user’s SINR resulting from the choices sk = s∗k
and dk = d∗k.
- p∗k = min{p¯k, Pk,max}, with p¯k the k-th user transmit
power such that the k-th user maximum SINR γ∗k equals
γ¯, i.e. the unique solution of the equation f(γ) = γf ′(γ),
with f ′(γ) the derivative of f(γ).
Proof: The proof is omitted here due to lack of space.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we illustrate some simulation results that
give insight into the performance of the proposed non-
cooperative games. We contrast here the performance of the
noncooperative game discussed in [7] with that of the games
proposed here. We consider an uplink DS/CDMA system with
processing gain N = 7, and assume that the packet length is
M = 120. for this value of M the equation f(γ) = γf ′(γ)
can be shown to admit the solution γ¯ = 6.689 = 8.25dB.
A single-cell system is considered, wherein users may have
random positions with a distance from the AP ranging from
10m to 500m. The channel coefficient hk for the generic k-th
user is assumed to be Rayleigh distributed with mean equal to
d−2k , with dk being the distance of user k from the AP10. We
9Uniqueness here means up to a positive scaling factor.
10Note that we are here assuming that the power path losses are proportional
to the fourth power of the path length, which is reasonable in urban cellular
environments.
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Fig. 2. Achieved average utility versus number of active users for the
proposed noncooperative games and for the game in reference [7]. The system
processing gain is N = 7.
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processing gain is N = 7.
take the ambient noise level to be N0 = 10−9W/Hz, while
the maximum allowed power Pk,max is 25dB. We present
the results of averaging over 104 independent realizations for
the users locations, fading channel coefficients and starting
set of spreading codes. More precisely, for each iteration we
randomly generate an N × K-dimensional spreading code
matrix with entries in the set
{
−1/√N, 1/√N
}
; this matrix
is then used as the starting point for the games that include
spreading code optimization, and as the spreading code matrix
for the games that do not perform spreading code optimization.
Figures 2 - 4 report the achieved average utility (measured
in bits/Joule), the average user transmit power and the average
achieved SINR at the receiver output for the game in [7] and
for the three non-cooperative games considered in this paper.
Inspecting the curves, the following conclusions can be drawn.
First of all, it is seen that all of the proposed games outperform
the one proposed in [7]: of course this result can be easily
justified by noting that the proposed games can take advantage
of the optimization of the spreading codes and of the superior
performance that non-linear receivers provide over linear ones.
As an example, it is seen that for a system with K = N = 7
the game with SIC/MMSE plus spreading code optimization
achieves a utility that is more than 3 times larger than that
achieved by the game in [7] and with a simultaneous average
transmit power saving of almost 3dB.
For K ≤ N , a very substantial performance gain can be
obtained by resorting to spreading code optimization; indeed,
when K ≤ N , users can be given orthogonal spreading
codes, so that the multiaccess channel reduces to a superpo-
sition of K separate single-user AWGN channels. Obviously,
in this situation the spreading code optimization algorithms
converge to a set of orthogonal codes, and this explains
the performance gains reported in the figures. Interestingly,
for K ≤ N the performance of the linear MMSE and of
the SIC/MMSE receivers with spreading code optimization
coincide: this is an indirect confirmation that in this case the
steady-state spreading codes are orthogonal, since in this case
no distinction occurs between the SIC/MMSE receiver and
the linear one. In the oversaturated region (i.e. for K > N ),
instead, the merits of the non-linear SIC/MMSE can be clearly
seen. Indeed, in this situation the spreading codes, whether
optimized or not, are linearly dependent, and this leads to
a severe performance degradation for any linear processing.
In this region SIC/MMSE plus spreading code optimization
is thus the best option, followed by SIC/MMSE with no
spreading code optimization. Note that there is a crossing
around K = 11 between the performance of the MMSE
receiver with spreading code optimization and that of the
SIC/MMSE with no spreading code optimization, revealing
that for lightly loaded systems much can be gained through
spreading code optimization, while for heavily loaded systems
the most significant gains come from the use of non-linear
processing. It is also seen from Fig. 4 that receivers achieve on
the average an output SINR that is smaller than the target SINR
γ¯: indeed, due to fading and distance path losses, achieving
the target SINR would require for some users a transmit power
larger than the maximum allowed power Pk,max, and so these
users are not able to achieve the optimal target SINR. As a
confirmation of this, in Fig. 5 we report the fraction of users
transmitting at the maximum power: it is seen here that even
for the SIC/MMSE receiver with spreading code optimization
this fraction is larger than 0.1.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper the cross-layer issue of joint power control,
spreading code optimization and receiver design for wireless
data networks has been addressed using a game-theoretic
framework. Building on [7], we have proposed a more general
framework wherein also spreading code optimization and non-
linear decision feedback multiuser receivers can be used to
further increase the energy efficiency of CDMA-based wireless
networks. It has been shown that spreading code optimization
in non-overloaded system, and non-linear reception techniques
in overloaded systems, bring remarkable performance gains.
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Fig. 4. Achieved average output SINR versus number of active users for
the proposed noncooperative games and for the game in reference [7]. The
system processing gain is N = 7.
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Fig. 5. Average fraction of users transmitting at their maximum allowed
power versus number of active users for the proposed noncooperative games
and for the game in reference [7]. The system processing gain is N = 7.
The authors’ current research is focused on the development
and the analysis of adaptive algorithms able to implement the
said games without prior knowledge of the fading channel
coefficients.
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APPENDIX
Given the relation
sk =
√
pkhk
(
pkhk2DD
T + µkIN
)+
dk (20)
we show here how to choose the constant µk so that ‖sk‖ =
1. Let UΛUT be the eigendecomposition of the matrix
pkhk2DD
T
. Obviously, U is an orthonormal matrix whose
columns are the eigenvectors of pkhk2DDT , and Λ is the
corresponding diagonal eigenvalue matrix. Note that some of
these eigenvalue will be zero for K < N . Now, letting ui and
λi denote the i-th column of U and the i-th diagonal element
of Λ, respectively, and
z(λi, µk) =
 1λi+µk if λi + µk 6= 00 if λi + µk = 0 , (21)
it is easy to show that (20) can be rewritten as
sk =
√
pk
N∑
i=1
z(λi, µk)uiu
T
i dk . (22)
From (22) it is seen that, as µk → +∞, ‖sk‖ → 0, thus
implying that there exists a finite constant Qu such that
‖sk‖ < 1 for any µk ≥ Qu. Now, let λm = mini λi (note
that λm may be 0 if K < N or in general if DDT is not of
full rank). It is easy to show that, as µk → λ+m, ‖sk‖ → +∞.
Accordingly, there exists a finite constant Ql > λm such that
‖sk‖ > 1 for µk ∈]λm, Ql]. Since ‖sk‖ is monotonically
decreasing for µk ∈ [Ql, Qu] and since ‖sk‖ > 1 for µk = Ql
and ‖sk‖ < 1 for µk = Qu, there exists just one value of µk,
say µ∗k, such that ‖sk‖ = 1 for µk = µ∗k. The value of µ∗k can
be found using standard methods.
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